Kenya's crumbling government
The great rift
Apr 23rd 2009 NAIROBI
From The Economist print edition
Only greed and pressure from abroad now bind the ruling politicians together
AFTER the horrendous violence that followed Kenya’s flawed general election in 2007, the mediation of Kofi Annan, a former secretary-general of the United Nations, was acclaimed for pushing the two main political parties into a coalition government. This at least stopped the bloodshed. Now, however, the deal is unravelling—fast. At a recent summit feuding government ministers could not even agree on what to discuss in order to find common ground. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) of the prime minister, Raila Odinga, stomped out before the meeting had even begun, accusing President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) of blocking the agenda.
Among the foreign diplomats looking on, optimists refer to the squabbling coalition as an “unconsummated marriage”. The less charitable say Kenya does not have a functioning executive at all, just an unholy alliance of fierce rivals. A schedule of constitutional, electoral, judicial, security, land and economic reforms was laid out in the original agreement between the two parties. A domestic tribunal to judge those responsible for the post-election mayhem was supposed to be set up and a truth commission established. Yet more than a year later the ODM and PNU have failed to agree on any of these issues. '); 
New corruption scandals, confined to no party, are regularly revealed by Kenya’s papers. With so many senior figures from the main parties co-opted into the government—which has 94 ministers and deputies, each earning over $15,000 a month—Kenya has become almost a one-party state. Ministers constantly squabble over pay, protocol, seniority and even who gets the best rooms at government get-togethers. The churches, NGOs and foreign diplomats are left to play the role of opposition, cajoling and threatening from the sidelines.
The infighting and bickering have also confounded hopes for measures to tackle the causes of the post-election violence, or even the country’s increasing gang violence. For example, Mr Odinga backed calls for the resignation of the soldier turned chief of the police, Major-General Hussein Ali, after he had been heavily criticised by human-rights groups and the UN over the activities of police death-squads. But Mr Kibaki, who appointed Mr Ali, has refused to let him go, despite an agreement to have a civilian head of the police. This week clashes in central Kenya between villagers and gang members of a criminal sect known as the Mungiki, who belong to the Kikuyu group, Kenya’s biggest, left another 40 or so people dead.
Parliament reconvened this week. The next elections are not due until 2012, but so grave is the impasse that politicians are already attending to their political futures rather than present troubles. Martha Karua, who resigned as justice minister on April 6th in protest at Mr Kibaki’s decision to appoint judges without consulting her, has said she will run for president. She gives press interviews, addresses crowds and lambasts the government she so recently abandoned as if a national poll were due for next week. Ms Karua is popular because she gives voice to the disgust felt by ordinary Kenyans towards their politicians. Her resignation is seen as a rare display of principle.
Unfortunately for Kenya, all that holds the coalition together now is mutual greed and pressure from abroad. Despite everything, foreign donor governments are nonetheless determined that the coalition should not collapse entirely. They believe any government is better than none, fearing yet more violence.
Mr Annan may intervene again. Within a few months, unless the domestic courts deal with the matter properly, he promises to hand over to the International Criminal Court the names of ten people considered by a special Kenyan commission to be responsible for the post-election violence. The removal of these figures from Kenya’s politics, and even from the cabinet itself, might give a useful jolt to the country’s dysfunctional political system.
译文:
大裂谷
风雨飘摇的肯尼亚政府
大裂谷
2009年4月23日 内罗毕
摘自《经济学人》印刷版
当前，只有自身贪婪和国外压力方可促使当权的政治家联合。
在肯尼亚于2007年举行过存有缺陷的换届选举后，令人惊惧的暴力事件接踵而来。作为一名调解人，联合国前任秘书长科菲-安南对推动该国两大主要政党在组建联合政府上达成协定而深受人们赞赏。毕竟，此举至少可以阻止流血事件的发生。不过，双方的协定当前正面临（快速地）瓦解。在刚刚举行的一场首脑会议上，长期争斗的政府部长们甚至不能就寻求达成共识的讨论议题取得一致意见。此外，肯尼亚总理奥廷加领导的橙色民主运动还在会议召开前重拳出击，指责总统齐贝吉带领的民族团结党在阻挠会议日程。
在外国外交人士的关注中，乐观主义者将这一口角不断的联盟视为一场“未有完婚的婚姻”。不甚宽容的人们则认为肯尼亚根本就没有一个正常运行的行政机构，只有一个凶猛政敌们所组建的邪恶联盟。各种关于宪法，选举，司法，安全，土地和经济改革中的最初协议皆有双方党派协商达成。一个用来审判那些在选举后制造混乱元凶的国内法庭理应建立，一个用来调查真相的委员会也理应成立。然而，一年多的时间过去了，橙色民主运动和民族团结党却未能就此类议题达成任何协议。
肯尼亚国内媒体经常爆料任何党派均会存有的腐败新丑闻。由于如此众多的两大政党政要增选进入政坛，肯尼亚政府现已设有94名部长和副部长，每人月薪超过15000美元，肯尼亚几乎已沦为一个一党专制的国家。政府部长们时常会因薪水，协议，资历，甚至为占有政府联欢会上的最好房间展开“口水战”。教会，非政府组织和外国使节只能扮演反对派的角色，并会受到肯尼亚政局旁观者的哄骗和威胁。
在换届大选举行后，肯尼亚国内已经发生了许多暴力事件，甚至日益增长的帮派暴力案件。政府部长们的明争暗斗和你争我吵也已促使肯尼亚采取措施遏制以上事件诱因的希望化为泡影。举例来说，由士兵晋升到警署长官的侯赛因-阿里纵容警察暗杀队的种种举动受到了人权组织和联合国的严厉指责。随后，肯尼亚总理奥廷加对外界呼吁少将阿里辞职的要求也表示支持。尽管两党协议规定警署长官需由文职人员担任，但委任阿里担任警署长官的总统齐贝吉却拒绝令其离职。本周，肯尼亚中部地区发生了村民同蒙吉齐帮派（肯尼亚国内最大的帮派）成员冲突的事故，致使40多人死亡。
肯尼亚议会将在本周重新召开。尽管肯尼亚下届选举预计要到2012年举行，但如此严重的僵局却促使政客优先考虑自身的仕途，而非解决当前的困境。4月6日，马莎-卡鲁亚宣布辞去肯尼亚司法部长的职位，以抗议总统齐贝吉任命法官未同其事前商议的决定。卡鲁亚也已经做出竞选总统的表态。此外，她还接受记者采访，举行公开演讲和抨击本届政府，仿佛一场全国性的选票活动在下周就要举行。卡鲁亚女士之所以深孚众望是因为她发出了肯尼亚普通民众对国内政治家反感的心声。她的辞职也被认为是一种坚持原则的罕见表现。
对肯尼亚而言不幸的是，当前国内两党的贪婪和来自国外的压力才可促使联合政府不会破裂。尽管如此，乐善好施的外国政府还是仍然坚信，联合政府不应完全崩溃。他们认为，有政府总比无政府好，并对肯尼亚国内将会发生更多暴力事件深感忧心忡忡。
联合国前任秘书长安南可能会再次做出调解。如果肯尼亚国内法庭不妥善处理此事，安南承诺将在数月内把一份由10人组成的名单移交给国际刑事法庭。肯尼亚一特别委员会认为这10人对大选过后国内出现的暴力事件负有责任。肯尼亚政界，甚至内阁将他们免职可能会给该国难以奏效的政治体制带来一次有益的震动。