THE beast which gives its name to the Chinese new year that begins on January 26th is meant to symbolise prosperity through fortitude and hard work, offering hope that China will soon regain its economic vigour. But an ox is often a castrated bull—which may be an apt description of China’s economic pain. New figures show that China’s GDP growth fell to 6.8% in the year to the fourth quarter, down from 9% in the third quarter and half its 13% pace in 2007. Growth of 6.8% may still sound pretty robust, but it implies that growth was virtually zero on a seasonally adjusted basis in the fourth quarter.
Industrial production has slowed even more sharply, growing by only 5.7% in the 12 months to December, compared with an 18% pace in late 2007. Thousands of factories have closed and millions of migrant workers have already lost their jobs. But there could be worse to come. Chinese exports are likely to drop further in coming months as world demand shrinks. Qu Hongbin, an economist at HSBC, forecasts that exports in the first quarter could be 19% lower than a year ago. 2009 may well see the first full-year decline in exports in more than a quarter of a century.
Economists have become gloomier about China’s prospects, with many now predicting GDP growth of only 5-6% in 2009, the lowest for almost two decades. The most dismal view comes from Albert Edwards, at Société Générale, a French bank, who thinks China may be sliding into outright recession. He points to a fall in electricity output of 6% in the year to the fourth quarter, down from average annual growth of 15% over the previous five years.
In the past, the growth in GDP and electricity use have tended to move together . Mr Edwards reckons that a decline in electricity output may mean that GDP is falling, no matter what the official figures say. Equally worrying is the OECD’s leading indicator of economic activity in China, which has plunged to its lowest level in its 26-year history, lower even than during the slump in 1989, the year of the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.
This makes for a compelling story. But the relationship between GDP and electricity consumption has been distorted by the uneven nature of this slowdown. Energy-guzzling heavy industries, such as steel and cement, bore the brunt of China’s downturn late last year. So it is not surprising that electricity use slumped.
Moreover, too much weight may be given to the declining exports, because it is often wrongly assumed that the slump in China’s growth has been caused mainly by a collapse in its exports to America and other rich economies. Yet in 2008 the fall in net exports (exports minus imports) accounted for less than half of its slowdown. More important was a collapse in housing construction, caused by the government’s efforts to deflate a potential bubble. This, in turn, reduced the demand for materials such as steel. So by the fourth quarter there had been a huge build-up in stocks, exacerbating the fall in production: steel output was 12% lower than a year earlier.
GDP growth is likely to continue to fall during the first half of 2009, sounding alarm bells among those who repeat the official mantra that China needs to grow by at least 8% a year to avoid social unrest (even though that number has no sound economic basis). But there is good reason to hope that by midyear the economy will perk up as destocking comes to an end and the government’s fiscal stimulus kicks in.
China’s 4 trillion yuan ($585 billion) package of infrastructure spending, subsidies and tax cuts for businesses has been trashed by many commentators as another “Chinese fake”. Most of it is not new money, they claim, and the central government will finance less than one-third of the planned spending; most of the rest will have to come from banks, which in the current climate may be reluctant to lend.
It is true that some of the extra spending had already been announced, but what matters for economic growth is how much spending will actually increase this year. The answer is a lot. For example, JPMorgan forecasts that transport investment will expand by an impressive 70% in 2009. HSBC estimates a total spending boost of 6-7% of GDP over this year and next.
Since the November package, the government has introduced other measures to support the economy. On January 21st it announced extra spending of 850 billion yuan over three years to improve health care. From February rural residents will get a 13% rebate on purchases of goods such as refrigerators, TVs and washing machines. Consumer spending will be dented by job losses and smaller wage rises but has so far remained strong, with retail sales up by 18% in real terms in the year to December. Interest rates have also been cut five times since September and, much more important, controls on bank lending have been scrapped. To help the property sector, minimum down-payments have been reduced from 30-40% of a home’s value to 20%, the transaction tax has been waived for properties held for at least two years, and more public housing is to be built.
The all-too visible hoof
Chris Wood, at CLSA, a brokerage, says the effectiveness of the stimulus hinges on the extent to which China is now a capitalist economy. The more “capitalist” it is, the deeper the downturn now; the more it is still a command economy, the better the chance of recovery in 2009. State-controlled firms, which account for one-third of industrial output and almost half of all investment, have been “asked” not to cut jobs and capital spending. All the big banks are state-owned and their chairmen are appointed by the government. If they get a phone call telling them to lend more, they are likely to do so.
Banks already seem to be following Beijing’s orders: total lending surged by 19% in the year to December. China is one of the few large economies whose banking system has not been crippled by the global credit crunch. Andy Rothman, also at CLSA, argues that “in China, there is only a credit crunch when the political leadership wants one”. He believes the economy will revive by midyear and achieve GDP growth of close to 8% for 2009 as a whole.
The obvious concern is that although heavy-handed government meddling may be more effective than market-based tools to pull an economy out of a deep downturn, it comes at a cost. Public investment will inevitably include some wasteful spending, and politically directed lending could add to excess capacity in some sectors and create new bad loans for banks. This may hobble the bull in the future. But first it needs to regain its virility.
译文:
低迷的中国经济能否重拾牛劲？
1月26日是中国的农历牛年，牛预示着通过坚忍不拔的努力和辛勤的工作而获得成功，这为中国经济重获活力带来了希望。然而，牛通常是指被阉割过的，这对正出于低迷的中国经济是最恰当不过的形容了。新的数据显示中国GDP在去年的第四季度由第三季度的13%跌至6.8%，仅是07年同期的的一半。6.8%的增长听上去依然挺强健，但这意味着第四季度的增长实际为零。
工业生产的放慢更为明显，与2007年18%的增长速度相比，在12月份的增长仅为5.7。数以万计的工厂倒闭，数百万民工失去工作。而这还不是最坏的，由于全球需求的萎缩，中国的出口在未来几月内很有可能继续下降。汇丰银行的经济学者曲宏斌预计第一季度的出口额可能比去年同期减少19%。中国在2009年可能出现25年来的首次全年外贸出口下滑。
经济学者们对中国的前景看法更加悲观，许多人预测2009年中国的GDP增长会跌至近二十年来的最低点，仅为5-6%。法国兴业银行的阿尔伯特·爱德华兹的观点最为悲观，他认为中国经济会陷入全面衰退。他指出截止到第四季度，中国的发电量由前五年平均年发电量15%下降了6%。
过去，GDP的增长与耗电量往往成正比。爱德华兹先生认为，无论官方数据怎样，发电量减少就意味着GDP在下降。经济合作发展组织主要指示器的显示指出中国经济活动的结果也同样令人担忧。该指示器已经跌倒26年来的最低点，甚至比1989年天安门动乱时期还要低。
这是无法争议的事实。但是，由于这次经济减速的不平衡性，GDP与用电量之间的关系已经被扭曲了。如钢铁、水泥等高能耗的重工业在去年经济下滑中首当其冲，因此耗电量减少也不足为奇。
此外，由于人们经常错误地认为中国经济增长的放缓主要缘于对美和其他经济发达国家出口的下降，萎缩的出口量也可能因此承受过多的压力。然而，这次放缓至少有一半原因是2008年净出口量（出口量减去进口量）下降造成的。更重要的是，由于政府试图去除潜在的经济泡沫，而造成房地产业崩溃。反之，又降低了对像钢铁这类材料的需求。因此，所以到第四季度为止，巨大的建筑材料库存加剧了产量的减少。钢铁产量比去年同期下降12%。
2009年上半年GDP很可能继续下滑，这给那些重复政府观点的人敲了警钟，他们认为中国年经济增长必须保持在8%以上才能维持社会稳定，而这一说法也没有可靠的经济学依据。但是，到09年中期，由于库存缩减接近尾声，加之政府财政刺激措施介入，中国经济很有可能复苏。
中国4万亿元（5850亿美元）的计划包括基础设施建设支出，经济援助和削减商业税，被很多评论员贬为有一个“中国式造假”，他们认为这是另一次的“中国假造”。他们称，这计划中大部分都不是新货币，中央政府拿出的钱不到计划的三分之一；其余大部分将由银行承担，而在当前的经济形势下，银行是不情愿借钱的。
虽然已经宣布了一些额外的支出，但是影响经济增长的是这一年能真正增加多少支出。答案是，很多。例如，摩根大通预计2009年，交通业投资将会大幅增加70%。汇丰银行估计全部的消费能使今年和明年的GDP增长6-7%。
自从去年11月的一揽子救世计划以来，政府已经采取了其他措施来刺激经济。1月21日，政府又宣布未来三年将投入8500亿元用于改进医疗卫生事业。2月份起，农民购买诸如冰箱、彩电、洗衣机之类商品能够获得13%的退税。消费支出会受到失业和加薪幅度减小的影响，但迄今为止依然保持强劲的势头。截止到12月，零售额实际增长18%。自9月份以来，央行已经连续下调了五次利率，更重要的是，对银行贷款的限制也放松了。为了恢复房地产市场，最低现付额已经由房产价格的30-40%下降到20%，房主的交易税也可以至少推迟两年再缴纳，政府还将建造更多公共住房。
清晰可见的牛蹄
里昂证券有限公司的经纪人克里斯·伍德说经济刺激计划是否有效取决于中国经济的资本化程度。“资本化”程度越高，经济就越低迷；计划经济的程度越高，2009年恢复经济的可能性就越大。中国国有企业占工业产出的三分之一和近乎一般的投资，被“要求”不得裁员或减少消费。所有的大银行都是国有，其董事长也都由政府任命。如果他们接到一个电话要多放贷款，他们就会照做。
银行似乎已经在执行北京政府的命令了：截止到12月，贷款总额飙升了19%。中国的是全球为数不多，银行体系未受全球信贷危机波及的几个大经济体制一。同在里昂证券的安迪·罗斯曼称“在中国，只有政治领导人想要的时候才会出现信贷危机”。他相信2009年中期中国经济就能恢复，全年DGP增长也会将近8%。
尽管政府的重拳干预可能会比基于市场的工具更有效地将经济拉出低谷，但明显令人担心的是为此付出的代价有多大。公共投资势必会导致一些浪费，而且政治引导下的贷款会使一些部门能力多余，并给银行造成新的不良贷款。这可能会在未来困住中国这头公牛。但是，眼下它必须先恢复活力。