贯穿于多元化市场中的组织设计和控制:便利店产业的特许经营项目

读者: 1250    发布时间: 2008

原文: Organizational Design and Control across Multiple Markets: The Case of Franchising in the Convenience Store Industry

Published: May 8, 2008
Paper Released: April 2008
Authors: Dennis Campbell, Srikant M. Datar, and Tatiana Sandino

Executive Summary:

Chain organizations operate units that are typically dispersed across different types of markets, and thus serve significantly different customer bases. Such "market-type dispersion" is likely to compromise the headquarters' ability to control its stores for two reasons: Relative differences in local conditions make it difficult to monitor a store manager's behavior, and a chain with wide-ranging customer bases will have a harder time serving its customers and will need to rely more heavily on store managers' ability to adapt to local needs. This study identifies market-type dispersion as a factor that is systematically related to firms' organizational design choices. The results may help managers and consultants who deal with control challenges related to a chain's geographic expansion into different markets. Key concepts include:

  • Chains experiencing higher levels of variation in customer demands across different locations are more likely to increase delegation and the provision of incentives through the organizational design choice of franchising.
  • Stores are more likely to be franchised when their location characteristics are more divergent from the most prevalent location characteristics of the chain as a whole.
  • Non-franchisor chains with higher levels of such market-type dispersion tend to decentralize operations to a greater extent. It is also possible that they provide higher variable pay.

Abstract

Many companies operate units which are dispersed across different types of markets, and thus serve significantly diverging customer bases. Such market-type dispersion is likely to compromise the headquarters' ability to control its local managers' behavior and satisfy the divergent needs of different types of customers. In this paper we find evidence that market-type dispersion is an important determinant of delegation and the provision of incentives. Using a sample of convenience store chains, we show that market-type dispersion is related to the degree of franchising at the chain level as well as the probability of franchising a given store within a chain. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of market-type dispersion and to other determinants of franchising such as the stores' geographic distance from headquarters and geographic dispersion. Additional analyses also suggest that chains that do not franchise at all, may cope with market-type dispersion by decentralizing operations from headquarters to their stores, and, to a weaker extent, by providing higher variable pay to their store managers.

译文: 贯穿于多元化市场中的组织设计和控制:便利店产业的特许经营项目

出版日期:2008年5月8日

发行日期:2008年4月

作者:Dennis Campbell,Srikant M. Datar及 Tatiana Sandino

执行摘要:

连锁机构运作单元的特色就是将市场划分成不同的类型,然后重点服务不同的客户群。这种“市场类型划分”可能会削弱总部控制下属商店的能力,这有两方面的原因:两地的相对差异造成了对店长的的管理难度;而且,涵盖宽泛层次客户群的连锁店为客人提供服务要困难的多,所以为了适应当地的需求,就更加依赖店长的能力。这项研究将市场类型细分归结为能系统地影响公司组织设计选择的一个因素。这些研究结果可能会帮助那些随时处理控制挑战的管理者和顾问们,而这些挑战关系到连锁链条在不同市场中的地域扩展性。其主要内容有:

根据不同地区的特点,在顾客需求方面经历更高层级变化的连锁店,通过对获得特许经营权组织的组织结构设计选择有可能会增加授权以及对各种诱因的提供。

如果商店的地域特点更容易与整个链条里大部分相关的地域特点区分开来的话,这些商店就更容易获得特许经营权。

无特许经销商的连锁店在很大程度上趋向于分散经营,这种模式对市场类型的划分有着更高的水平。他们提供较高而多变的薪酬也是有可能的。

概要

连锁机构运作单元的特色就是讲市场划分成不同的类型,然后重点服务不同的客户群。这种“市场类型划分”有可能削弱总部控制下属商店的能力,有两方面的原因:两地的相对差异造成了对店长的的管理难度,同时也降低了不同客户对不同需求的满意度。在这篇文章里我们发现市场类型的划分是决定授权和提供诱因的重要决定因素。利用连锁便利店这个模型,我们看到市场类型的划分既与在连锁档次中所得授权的大小有关,也与在连锁链条中特许经营的能力有关。我们所得到的结果对调整市场类型分化的定义有很强的建设性,对诸如店铺与总部在地理距离上的远近或地理上的划分等其他它影响授权的因素都有很好的指导性。

传统意义上的评估,也会建议对连锁店不做任何的特许授权,也许会复制市场类型划分这种模式,但,却是通过从总部到店铺分散经营的,或者从一个小的层面上来说,通过提供给店面经理更加丰厚而多变的薪水体现出来。